

## **ELISABETTA PASINI**

[e.pasini@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:e.pasini@qmul.ac.uk)

### **QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

#### **OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION**

Queen Mary University of London  
Mile End Road, GC425  
London, E1 4NS, UK  
[e.pasini@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:e.pasini@qmul.ac.uk)  
<http://elisabettapasini.weebly.com>

#### **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Citizenship: Italian  
Gender: Female  
Date of birth: 03 January 1988  
Mobile: +44 07928081579

#### **QUEEN MARY PLACEMENT OFFICER**

Dr. Andrea Tesei [a.tesei@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:a.tesei@qmul.ac.uk)  
+44 020 78828840

**DOCTORAL STUDIES** Queen Mary University of London, 2014 to present  
PhD in Economics, Expected completion May 2020

DISSERTATION: “Essays on the Economics of Migration and Education”

**FIELDS** Primary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics  
Secondary Fields: Economics of Migration, Economics of Education

#### REFERENCES:

Prof. Barbara Petrongolo  
Queen Mary University  
Mile End Road  
London, E1 4NS  
+44 20 7882 8421  
[b.petrongolo@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:b.petrongolo@qmul.ac.uk)

Dr. Francesco Fasani  
Queen Mary University  
Mile End Road  
London, E1 4NS  
+44 20 7882 5869  
[f.fasani@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:f.fasani@qmul.ac.uk)

Prof. Olmo Silva  
London School of Economics  
Houghton Street  
London, WC2A 2AE  
+44 20 7955 6036  
[o.silva@lse.ac.uk](mailto:o.silva@lse.ac.uk)

Prof. Marco Manacorda  
Queen Mary University  
Mile End Road  
London, E1 4NS  
+ 44 20 7882 8836  
[m.manacorda@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:m.manacorda@qmul.ac.uk)

**PRIOR EDUCATION** Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), 2013 to 2014  
MSc in Economics and Public Policy

University Ca' Foscari, 2010 to 2013  
MSc in Environmental Economics (*110/110 cum laude*)  
Exchange student, Duke University, Fall 2012

University of Verona, 2007 to 2010  
BSc in Business and Management

<b>TEACHING EXPERIENCE</b>	<p>Teaching Assistant, Undergraduate, Queen Mary, 2015 to 2019 Courses: Economics of Social Issues, Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II, Advanced Microeconomics.</p> <p>Dissertation supervision master students, Queen Mary University. Excellence in Teaching Award for class teaching, Queen Mary, 2017/18</p>
<b>RELEVANT POSITIONS</b>	<p>Research Assistant to O. Silva (LSE), 2018 to present Research Assistant, Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019 Research Assistant to F.Fasani and T. Frattini, 2015</p>
<b>PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	<p><i>Conference presentations:</i></p> <p>2019: EALE Conference, Uppsala University; Second PhD Workshop, Queen Mary University; Royal Economic Society (RES) Junior Symposium, University of Warwick.</p> <p>2018: IZA Migration Meeting, Harvard University, Boston; European Economic Association (EEA), Cologne; LSE-Oxford Graduate Student Conference, LSE; Royal Economic Society (RES) Annual Conference, University of Sussex; Third Workshop on Immigration and Well Being, UPF, Barcelona.</p> <p>2017: CReAM/RWI Workshop on the Economics of Migration, Essen; Third Workshop on Migration, University of Southampton.</p> <p><i>Seminar presentations:</i></p> <p>2019: Queen Mary University; Paris School of Economics; London School of Economics 2018: London School of Economics; Queen Mary University 2017: Queen Mary University 2016: Queen Mary University</p> <p><i>Scientific Committees:</i></p> <p>Royal Economic Society Symposium of Junior Researchers, 2019 Queen Mary PhD Workshop, 2018 – 2019</p>
<b>FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS</b>	<p><i>Grants and Scholarships:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2018: Royal Economic Society (RES) Grant Academic Expenses (awarded)</li> <li>- 2017: Nuffield Foundation, research grant “Asylum policies in Europe and the refugee crisis: new empirical evidence for better policy making?” (£155,000), member of the research team. Principal investigator Francesco Fasani (QMUL)</li> <li>- 2014 ESRC Studentship (£76,000 over 4 years of PhD)</li> <li>- 2012: Venice International University Scholarship for Semester Abroad</li> </ul>

**RESEARCH  
PAPERS*****“Migration and Competition for Schools: Evidence from Primary Education in England”***  
**(Job Market Paper)**

In this paper, I exploit the 2004 European Union enlargement to examine the impact of the demand for education generated by migrants on school enrollment and the achievement of native students. I predict migrants' location decision by using a novel instrumental variable that exploits the quasi-random allocation of migrants induced by a dispersal policy implemented in the 1940s. I find that foreign students displace natives from schools, particularly in neighborhoods where schools are at full capacity. My estimates suggest that for every ten non-native students, three natives are displaced. In particular, natives are displaced towards schools with similar value added and distance from home but with a higher proportion of lower performing and disadvantaged peers. However, I find that the presence of migrants is associated with higher test scores among natives. I provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that displaced students generate positive peer effects on the native students to whom they are exposed to following displacement. Overall, the findings suggest that the presence of migrants have a net positive effect on the educational outcomes of natives.

***“The Politics of Asylum Seekers Allocation? Evidence from the UK ”***  
**(with Francesco Fasani)**

Will the recent European refugee crisis produce lasting political consequences for receiving countries? In this paper, we study the effects of hosting asylum seekers on voting behavior and electoral turnout in the UK - a major destination country for refugees - between 2002 and 2017. Over this period, asylum seekers are assigned to different districts through a dispersal policy and have no say in their allocation. Our empirical analysis is twofold. First, we investigate whether the central government acts strategically in the placement process by testing if local political outcomes determine future assignment of asylum seekers. After finding evidence of politics in the allocation, we study how hosting asylum seekers shapes voting behavior and electoral turnout in local elections. We develop an instrumental variable strategy based on predetermined availability of social housing to deal with the endogeneity in the placement, which is generated by the central government's strategic behavior. Throughout the analysis, we study how all our estimated relationships of interest change after 2010, once Labour central governments are replaced by Conservative-led ones. Our findings suggest that residents of areas that are assigned more asylum seekers tend to: i) punish the ruling party, ii) move to the right of the political spectrum, iii) have a higher turnout.

***“Heterogeneous Effects of Mass Academisation in England”***  
**(with Lorenzo Neri)**

A reform of the UK education system in 2010 gave public schools the option to become academies, independent entities funded directly from the central government. Once converted, schools have to choose between remaining a standalone academy or joining an academy chain. The majority of studies to date have focused on the impact of becoming an academy on children outcomes, disregarding the possible heterogeneity arising from the adoption of alternative conversion models. Administrative records for primary school-age students before and after conversion allow us to shed light on this channel by using a grandfathering instrument for attending a converted school. We find that students in academy chains have better standardized scores with respect to their peers in standalone academies. The use of survey data offers possible explanations for this result: schools joining a chain are more likely to make changes related to managerial practices, whereas standalone academies favor changes related to educational practices.

***“The organizational Economics of School Chains”***  
**(with Lorenzo Neri and Olmo Silva)**

Academics and policy makers are increasingly advocating school autonomy as a way to improve student achievement. At the same time, however, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of ‘chains’ that bind schools together into institutionalized structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists on the determinants and effects of differences in the organizational set-up of school chains. Our work aims to fill this gap. We use the insights of the incomplete contracts literature to study the internal organization of school chains seen as firms. We match detailed survey information on decentralization decisions of procurement activities regarding 410 chains and 2,000 schools in England to student, school and market-level administrative records. We find that chains with a larger share of schools whose leadership background is aligned with the chain board’s expertise, younger chains, and chains that are closer to the market value-added (‘productivity’) frontier decentralize more. We find instead no association between the value-added heterogeneity of the markets in which the chains operate and their decision to delegate.